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 Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses contradictions within concepts of children's 
competence or capacity to consent, with examples drawn from research 
on children's consent to surgery. Competence entails understanding and 
wisdom. Yet definitions of understanding as esoteric abstract 
professional expertise conflict with the kinds of profound understanding 
some sick children have, drawn from their experience, thought and 
feeling. `Wisdom' combines Kantian reason which discerns the correct 
decision with Millean maturity which accepts responsibility for freely 
made decisions, even if these are mistaken; concepts of a correct choice 
conflict with those of a best guess. Beliefs about children's inevitable 
immaturity are contradicted by the demonstrated maturity of certain 
young children. Children's rights to resources and to protection can 
contradict yet complement their autonomy rights. When children are 
assumed to be incompetent, `children's autonomy rights', which depend 
on demonstrable competence, is a contradiction in terms. Adults' 
interests and their notions of children's welfare and interests can conflict 
with children's views of their own interests. There is a tragic tension 
between informing and respecting sick children but also protecting them 
from avoidable stress. Yet protection can involve violence, as when 
treatment is enforced during efforts to protect children from disease. 
Rights entail responsibilities which can compromise yet enrich the child's 
autonomy.  
  Understanding these contradictions, realising when discussants are 
talking at cross purposes, resolving and overlapping over-sharp 
dichotomies are necessary early stages in furthering respect for 
children's rights. Respect for children's competence addresses the root 
cause of child abuse, through showing when reasoning can replace blind 
force.  
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 Contradictions within concepts of children's competence 
 
This paper discusses contradictions within concepts of children's 
competence or capacity to consent, with examples drawn from research 
on children's consent to surgery (Alderson 1993). The contradictions are 
found within the terms `competence', `children' and `rights'. Progress in 
greater respect for children's rights partly depends on wider 
acknowledgement of these contradictions. 
 
Dilemmas about surgery 
A recent sociological study of children's consent involved hundreds of 
interviews with children having surgery, and with their parents and 
health professionals caring for them. Many interviewees were troubled 
by conflicting beliefs about competence and rights whilst they struggled 
with dilemmas concerning young patients' best interests.  
  An example from a heart-lung transplant unit illustrates the difficulties. 
Children being considered for surgery spent four days in the unit with 
their parents, having intensive investigations and information. After 
seeing over one hundred children with cystic fibrosis, one member of the 
unit staff felt that they had profound knowledge of severe illness, 
intensive treatment, the meaning of death and the value of life. The 
family of 10-year-old `Sarah' had travelled hundreds of miles to the unit. 
Her father said angrily to Sarah, referring to one of the unit staff, `Tell 
her, tell her you don't want the bloody operation.' The staff member 
commented: 
  Her brother had died of cystic fibrosis, so she knew she was very ill. 
Her father was angry, and her parents were so sad, because they 
wanted her to have the operation. She was their only other child. 
So I said, `Do you really not want this operation?' I wanted to 
know what she knew. She had a concept of death. She found it 
very strange that her parents had been positive about death, and 
now they weren't. Why was it all right to be sick and go to 
heaven, and now, because of this operation, it wasn't all right? 
She was also confused because she didn't want to go through this 
operation. However, she agreed to stay for the whole week and 
then perhaps compromise, and be put you on a provisional list, 
`Until you decide you want to be on the actual list'. The next day 
she asked to go on the actual list because, `You listened. I don't 
like physio but "sorry you have to have it", same with medication. 
I just wanted to see what would happen if I said no.' 
    These children are given that right of choice. It's not a question of 
whether they are capable of making a decision. If a child truly 
understands what is involved and the alternative outcome, then 
they are not forced into agreeing to a transplant. That causes a lot 
of problems for nursing staff when the age of consent is now what 
- 16? Certainly that is an age we are comfortable with. Because 
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transplantation is a limited resource, it is important to select the 
children most likely to benefit from it, and we have time to do 
this... None of us knows whether transplantation is an 
appropriate treatment. There's only what is right or wrong for 
individuals. We don't have the right to assume we know what's 
appropriate for a particular family.  
  All the children we see have demonstrated an ability to make their own 
decisions. Whether they do it or not is another matter. Many 
aren't autonomous enough. One mother said to her son after his 
brother had died, `We owe it to your brother for you to have a 
transplant'. He was very distressed. I said to him, `If you didn't 
want that operation would you tell us?' He said, `No, because my 
mother would be so sad if I said that.' 
  I would say that often as young as four or five they can understand a 
lot about a transplant. Of course, it varies very much, and you 
can't generalise. I believe the child always has to be involved. We 
know that they literally have their life in their hands afterwards. 
If they stop taking their medications, for example, they will die. 
 
Competence: understanding, knowledge and wisdom 
Competence to consent to children's treatment has two main elements: 
understanding and wisdom. A competent child is one who `achieves a 
sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to 
understand fully what is proposed' and also has `sufficient discretion to 
enable him or her to make a wise choice in his or her own interests' 
(Gillick 1985: 423). (Children's independence is recognised in later statute 
law; when children are capable of consenting to an application to see 
their health records, parents' may only apply with the consent of the 
child. Access to health records Act, S. 4 (2). (1990).) Interviewees in the 
consent study ranged from those who, like the health professional 
quoted above, thought that certain young children can understand, to a 
few people who believed that no child can understand, because of 
immaturity or because no lay person of any age can understand enough 
of the relevant medical information to make an informed decision.  
  Decisions about major surgery involve both medical and personal 
knowledge. Personal issues include the patient's felt need for treatment 
based on experience of disease or disability and of past treatment (if 
any), as well as on personal hopes, fears and values. Sarah had had 
rigorous daily treatment all her life. She had watched her brother die of 
the same disease and appeared to have come to terms with her own 
probable fate. Such acceptance involves profound experience and 
thought. She had unique knowledge of her own case.  
  Yet the literature on consent attends almost entirely to medical and 
legal information (such as Faden and Beauchamp 1986); professional, 
textbook knowledge is highly valued, personal experiential knowledge 
is discounted. This dismissal has several effects. Children are assumed to 
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be ignorant, except in so far as they can recount medical information. 
The important contribution which they can, and often do, make to 
medical decision-making is rarely publicised. Academic theories of 
children's inabilities predominate (as when judges discuss whether an 
`intelligent 15 year old' is able to understand the meaning of 
contraception (Gillick 1985: 402, 409). The `non-competent child' who 
figures in the legal imagination is treated as arational rather then 
irrational. When children are credited, at least, with a misguided 
rationality (Perrin and Gerrity 1981), the importance of explaining and 
correcting misunderstandings is accepted. If children are implicitly 
treated as arational, then enforced treatment without regard for the 
child's views is endorsed by the courts (as when the views of a 17-year-
old young women `were of no weight' in influencing the court's decision 
in re W [1992]  Weekly Law Reports 3:758-82). 
  Severe or prolonged treatment can induce terror and despair in the 
child. Children who perceive treatment as worse than the disease risk 
having similar reactions to those of torture victims. Torture is defined as 
`breaking down a person's sense of identity'. It is exacerbated when 
people are in a strange culture, such as a hospital ward. It arouses 
feelings of utter helplessness, being out of control of events and one's 
own body, inability to sleep, or concentrate, irritability, confusion 
between feeling bad and being bad, the disintegration of mind and body. 
`A perfect way to cope with torture and prison is to disassociate your 
feelings from your experience; this is not the perfect way to cope with a 
love affair' or any intimate relationship. If it becomes a habit, children 
become emotionally crippled (Melzac 1992).  
Children as young as 2-years suffer such stress after disasters. They 
know why they have come for therapy. `I was on the ferry and 
saw lots of dead bodies.' We formerly thought they did not 
understand, because we did not ask them. A 6-year old attempted 
suicide after a ferry disaster. `I couldn't stand the bad pictures of 
the ferry in my mind any more' (Yule 1992). 
From early infancy, children begin to reason and to suffer mentally. 
Acceptance of a general licence to enforce treatment on `non-competent' 
children, as if they are unthinking or arational beings, is therefore 
misguided. It is extremely important to try to work with the child's 
informed agreement, or to defer any non-urgent treatment until the child 
can accept it.  
  Children's competence to make wise decisions is still more disputed 
than their understanding. Current definitions of competence as wisdom 
contain contradictions. Locke in 1690 (1959) and Kant in the 1780s (1972) 
argued that rational man, capable of pure reason and knowing the 
correct answer to moral questions, must be able to control his own life 
without interference. Women and children were denied this right as they 
were assumed to be irrational. In the 1850s, Mill (1982) acknowledged 
that not all moral questions have correct solutions, and advocated liberty 
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as the greatest good: the individual's sovereign right `over his own body 
and mind' to make wise or foolish decisions. No adult should be 
compelled into any decision unless this would prevent harm to others. 
Children were again excluded. 
  These two meanings of competence, wisdom to know the correct 
decision, or else courage and maturity to make a best guess and to accept 
responsibility and blame for mistakes, contradict one another. Yet both 
are integral to modern meanings of competence, as shown during the 
research interviews. For example: 
Interviewer: When do you think your daughter was or will be able to 
decide for herself about the proposed operation? 
Mother: Well, now at twelve she is very sensible. I think she could 
decide now. 
Interviewer: What would you do if you disagreed with her decision? 
Mother: I don't think we would disagree, she's very sensible. But then, I 
suppose if it's life-threatening, I'd want to have the last say - just 
in case. 
The mother's response could be guided by her beliefs about her 
daughter's ability, the ability and status of children generally, or her 
parental responsibilities. It is legitimate, indeed expected, for people to 
express such sentiments about their children and adolescents. Yet is the 
response necessarily age specific? If society approved of similar 
responsible concern being shown for adults, would not people make the 
same comments about adult relatives who go hang-gliding or feel 
suicidal?  
  A child's mature independent judgement which happens to agree with 
the adults' views can seem like dependent compliance. It is only when 
the child and adults disagree that competence becomes a live issue, and 
then children can be dismissed as foolish simply because they disagree 
with adults.   
  Competence is very hard to define positively; it is easier to define 
negatively, when it is obviously missing in bizarrely self-destructive 
decisions. The literature and law on consent to children's treatment tend 
to assume that almost any life-extending treatment is better than none, 
and that refusal of proposed medical treatment is inevitably 
incompetent, though the suffering this causes has been critically 
documented (Frohock 1986).  
  The reservations about transplantations discussed in the opening 
quotations are shared by many health professionals, but are seldom 
publicised. Sarah died while still on the waiting list. Arguably, the end of 
her life was more distressing and painful because of the vain hope of 
transplantation. (In some cases, there has been delay in giving morphine 
if there is hope of a last-minute transplantation, because it reduces the 
patient's eligibility for surgery.) Uncertainty about high-risk treatment 
accentuates the tragic tension between making a correct decision or a 
best guess. The tension is further complicated by assumptions about the 
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nature of childhood.  
 
Children and childhood 
What characteristics distinguish children from adults? Many children 
exceed many adults in size, strength, intelligence and in certain types of 
experience, such as very serious illness. Variations within and between 
societies as to whether 12-year-olds are treated as young adults or as 
dependent infants illustrate how children's and adults' assessments of a 
child's competence are influenced by cultural beliefs, at least as much as 
by the child's ability. The variations also show how children's infantile or 
adult speech, behaviour and independence are largely constructed 
through their social context (Solberg 1990). Yet the psychological 
literature on defining and assessing competence tends to take the child 
as the unit of analysis and unfolding competence as a biological fact, and 
to ignore the social context including the child's own experiences and the 
cultural beliefs about the nature of childhood (Melton et al 1983; Gaylin 
and Macklin 1982; Kopelman and Moskop 1989). 
  Twentieth century Western notions of childhood are dominated by 
developmental theories which implicity perceive children as partly 
formed human-becomings rather than as human-beings capable of full 
experiences and relationships as critically reviewed by the Stainton 
Rogers (1992). Beyond associating childhood with incompetent 
ignorance and folly, such notions take incompetence as the definitive 
and essential nature of childhood, the distinguishing feature from 
adulthood. A few interviewees in the consent study accepted this 
dichotomy, assuming that `children can't possibly decide for themselves 
until they grow up/ leave home/ have done A-level biology'. They 
dismissed the possibility of the competent child, or felt troubled or 
threatened by it. Most interviewees did not identify competence with 
age and believed that children could be competent. Yet influential 
ethicists (Buchanan and Brock 1989) and lawyers continue to accept 
simplistic status definitions of competence, and assert that most minors 
do not have the cognitive and moral maturity to evaluate complex 
decisions. 
  Anthropologists argue that the vague concept of the competent person 
is mainly defined negatively, by classifying certain groups as 
`incompetents' (Young 1990). Then adults, for example, do not need to 
question their own abilities, and can rest assured that they fit 
comfortably within the status of competent adulthood. Children's rights 
are far more than an intellectual matter; the unease and anger aroused 
during talk of children's autonomy indicate that such discussion deeply 
threatens adults' convenience, power and beliefs about the moral order. 
As discussed in the next section, if children are defined by their 
incompetence, ignorance and folly, then `children's rights' is essentially a 
contradictory term. 
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Rights 
Relationships between differing rights to resources, to protection and to 
self-determination or autonomy have been thoroughly considered 
(Freeman 1983; Franklin 1986; Alderson 1992). These rights reinforce and 
enrich one another, yet also conflict. When asked whether child patients 
should have autonomy rights, many interviewees replied, `Oh no, they'll 
only refuse surgery, they'll be too frightened.' Autonomy was assumed 
to jeopardise the child's rights to health care resources, and to protection 
or relief from untreated disease or disability. The importance of 
protection and resources in developing autonomy is frequently 
expounded. Yet this reverses the historical order of the development of 
rights. 
  Rights to autonomy and non-interference were the first rights to be 
propounded (Kant 1972), and they are epitomized in the right to 
consent. Consent has an impact on all other rights. It is about selecting 
options, negotiating and accepting or rejecting them. Beyond making a 
decision in the narrower legal sense, consent is about making an 
informed choice and becoming emotionally committed to it (Alderson 
1990). Consent can only happen when there is no force or coercion. 
Children's consent is about children being right-holders, deciding their 
own best interests and preferences, instead of adults deciding for them.  
  Most discussion of children's rights is confined to protection and 
resources. Rights language benefits children when their interests are 
enshrined in international conventions (United Nations 1989), and in 
legal entitlements. Yet most of this discourse could be as fully developed 
under the headings of welfare, best interests or needs which are 
determined by adults. Autonomy rights and consent can only be 
understood in the context of human and legal rights, and not of welfare. 
Willing consent is likely to increase therapeutic benefit from health care 
and to protect patients from treatment they consider unnecessary, 
useless or harmful. Yet the purpose of consent is to defend the patient's 
physical and mental integrity. With adults and children, as Sarah shows, 
there may be conflict between rights to refuse unwanted treatment, and 
rights to possibly beneficial treatment.  
  However, children interviewed in the consent study took their health 
very seriously. As an 11-year-old succinctly said, `If I didn't want the 
operation, my parents wouldn't make me have it. If I was going to die 
they'd make me. It would be the only sensible thing to do, but I'd agree.' 
It is very rare for children to refuse life-saving treatment, and in the view 
of a senior clinical psychologist their response should then be taken very 
seriously. Such refusal can be deeply perturbing with competent adult 
patients yet is respected in law. Why should not informed, wise children 
receive the same respect in cases when health professionals are uncertain 
what is the correct choice? A 13-year-old said, `I would like to see the age 
limits completely scrapped, and maturity brought in. As you grow up, 
your age has a stereotype. I'm trying to escape from that stereotype.' 
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  Numerous meetings supposedly devoted to children's rights actually 
promote adults' rights. An analogy would be 100 years ago, when men 
gathered to discuss `the women's rights problem'. Women would be 
absent as children are today. The men would discuss women's amusing 
foibles, weaknesses and need for protection. They would resolve to care 
for women still more considerately, and congratulate one another on 
their generous concern, mutually reinforcing their sexism. The same 
often happens today when adults discuss children; childism is so 
endemic and accepted that we do not yet have a word for it.   
  Emphasising vulnerability and protection does benefit those in need 
but can also increase and enforce vulnerable dependence (Kitzinger 
1990). In the past, a prudent woman ensured her rights to resources and 
protection by sacrificing her autonomy, and obeying her father or 
husband. In effect, she had no rights, only privileges dependent on men's 
whim or goodwill. Women acquired legal rights to resources (such as 
equal pay) and to protection (such as from rape within marriage) only 
after they had gained autonomy rights. The key to respect for women's 
rights is respect for their competence, accepting women as no less 
rational than men. The key to competent children's rights is acceptance 
that they can be as rational as adults. When their rights are grounded, as 
far as possible, in their rationality, they have a greater share in rights 
which adults take for granted. For example, `a competent patient has a 
fundamental right to grant or withhold consent prior to examination or 
treatment .. refusal must be respected' (Department of Health 1990). (The 
final phrase was echoed in Children Act 1989 though later challenged in 
the Court of Appeal (Re R 1991; re W 1992). As long as childhood is 
identified with irrationality, the main grounds for children's rights (as 
opposed to their welfare or interests) is missing. The ideal of `pure 
reason' which justified the first autonomy rights was supposed to be 
`free from all contingencies' (Kant 1975: 95-6). It is too narrow; `if rational 
was what nineteenth century gentlemen were, children no less than 
women will come to grief in the rationality stakes' (Hughes 1989). 
Meanings of wisdom itself are set in opposition, abstract academic 
theory versus personal experience. Yet people's knowledge about their 
needs and rights often stems from contingencies, their weakness and 
suffering. If children are to be respected as rational, their experiences 
must be seen as profound sources of knowledge.   
  Ultimately, all treatment decisions are either reasoned with patients or 
forced on them. Reason (impartial discussion, negotiation, informed 
choice) and force (ulterior constraint, duress, violence) are at opposite 
ends of a spectrum, with persuasion (ranging into over-optimism, deceit, 
fraud) in the centre. (These terms are taken from the crucible of concepts 
about patient consent, the Nuremberg Code 1947.) Impartial discussion 
is inevitably qualified by medical uncertainty, choice of words, pressures 
of the illness or disability being treated, and attempts to respect but also 
protect anxious children. So persuasion overlaps broadly with reason at 
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one end and force at the other. Yet at some point persuasion moves from 
informed optimism to deliberate distortion. Interviewees who gave high 
ages for consent tended to dismiss coercion as necessary firmness: `Kids 
only play up'; `They're only frightened', as if fear is irrational and 
therefore unimportant; `They've got to learn to put up with it for their 
own good'; `There isn't time to hang about until they're ready'. The most 
powerful way to justify coercion is to deny that children can reason, and 
to align adult reason with necessary force; children's resistance is then 
seen as mindless `self-destruction', to be overridden by rational adults.    
 Adults who respected consent at a younger age worried about the 
reason-force divide. A sister said, `I would always try to get a 
compromise.'  A surgeon said, `I don't try and persuade people. If 
someone isn't happy with the idea of surgery, we'll talk again in a few 
months time, or a few years, and very often they've changed their mind.' 
  Consent to surgery entails consent to bodily invasion and loss of 
control. Sometimes urgent force was required, and parents could help 
children towards accepting this. A surgeon commented,  
I regard the issue of consent as a partnership between parents, the 
patient and the doctor - none of these can work independently. 
The success of this depends on a lot of things, including the age 
and understanding of the child. Because of the risk that children 
will refuse necessary treatment, it is so important that the 
atmosphere is right, so that the child can voice their fears. 
Forcing information onto patients who would rather not know can be a 
form of coercion, but was usually seen as the lesser evil to forcing 
treatment on unprepared, resisting children. Sarah's initial resistance 
showed the crucial importance, whenever possible, of respecting and not 
coercing children. Treatment willingly undertaken is likely to have more 
therapeutic and placebo effect; not least because patients then 
understand the need to cooperate with taking drugs or doing 
physiotherapy. As quoted earlier, `they have their life in their hands'. 
  Another conflict about rights which troubled interviewees is shown in 
the earlier example of the boy who agreed to have a heart-lung 
transplant for his mother's sake. Rights are linked to responsibilities and 
personal autonomy is complicated yet enriched by concern for other 
people's interests. Rights language helpfully elucidates crucial issues, but 
only partially addresses the complex interdependence between child 
patients, parents, siblings and health professionals.    
 
Addressing contradictions 
So far, gaps and contradictions have been reviewed between: children's 
actual abilities versus their presumed inabilities; infant or adult; 
intellectual or experiential knowledge; a correct decision or a best guess; 
adults' versus children's status; uncritical acceptance of medical 
proposals versus knowledge of clinical risk and uncertainty; emotional 
or rational understanding; children's competence as a social construction 
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or an unfolding biological fact; the social context or the abstracted 
individual; rights to resources and protection versus autonomy rights; 
protection or abandonment; welfare, interest and need discourse versus 
rights discourse; reason or force; partnership or coercion; autonomy or 
interdependence; control over the treatment decision and/or over the 
treatment process; deciding for or with children.   
  This final section considers the main effects of these contradictions and 
some means of partially resolving them. When contradictions are seen as 
conflicting dichotomies, there are four main effects. First, in hierarchical 
pairs, the higher part is ascribed to adults (understanding, reason, 
wisdom) and the lower to children (ignorance, emotion, folly). Second, if 
a child exhibits one weaker characteristic, such as ignorance, all other 
weaker attributes tend to be loaded onto the child. Third, where there 
are conflicts and gaps, vital matters get lost between them. One example 
is the reason/emotion split, the myth that we can think without feeling 
and feel without thinking. This prevents reflexive thought through 
which adults learn how their own anxiety and anger prevent them from 
accepting the justice of children's rights. Another example is the loss of 
the competent child in the gap between infant and adult, so that 15-year-
olds are grouped with babies. Fourth, people talk at cross-purposes, not 
realising that they are defining, say, `rights' in opposite ways - as adult-
defined interests or as children's choices. 
  Respecting and listening to children enables adults to learn from 
children how to provide the information and support they need, also to 
discover which children want to defer decisions to adults, or to share in 
making decisions, and the minority who want to take the main 
responsibility for deciding about proposed surgery. Adults can work 
with the child towards the best possible decision. Most importantly, 
health professionals then set highly influential examples of reasoning 
and non-coercion, which challenge the assumption that adult might is 
right, and so address the root cause of child abuse (Violence against 
children study group 1990). 
  On a practical level, these measures would be encouraged by more 
empirical research with children faced with choices in hospitals, schools 
and homes. Ways of clearly informing children and respecting their 
decision-making need to be developed. However, the main contribution 
to increasing respect for children's rights is to question all the underlying 
contradictions. The advantages of thinking, instead, in overlapping pairs 
need to be advanced: children are often like adults and adults like 
children in their rationality, maturity and interdependence; reason and 
emotion, intellect and experience are integral to one another; all patients, 
adult and children, have relative and partial rights, and are constrained 
and protected by medicolegal and economic systems. (For example no 
patient can have treatment unless a doctor chooses to provide it, (Re J 
[1991] 3 All ER 930 934) and competence to children's treatment involves 
making a wise decision in the child's best interests as Eekelaar (1986) 
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admits despite his misgivings about children's autonomy.) Obviously 
there is a wide area for compromise between the extremes of either 
coercing children or abandoning them. The approach which draws 
together contradictions and combines respect with care (Gilligan 1982) 
was described by a chaplain and former headmaster during the consent 
study:  
But are you going to lay on children the weight of their future? Perhaps 
let them make a decision that could lead to their death? These are 
impossible questions, but hospital staff have to find the answers. 
Am I big enough to say, `Whatever you choose will be valued, 
even if you decide against the tide; okay, you've made that 
decision, I'll do all I can to support you, and we'll go forward 
together'? It's such a big step for the adult to surrender power to 
the child.  
 
We thank all the children and adults who helped with the children's 
consent study 1989-92, and the co-researcher Jill Siddle. The study was 
funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Royal Liverpool Children's 
Hospital Fund and the Gulbenkian Foundation.     
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